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THREE’S COMPANY:
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
PROHIBITING ACCESS TO THREE-PARENT
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
J. RAVINDRA FERNANDO*
I. INTRODUCTION
I belonged to a new underclass, no longer determined by social status or the
color of your skin.  No, we now have discrimination down to a science.1
The 1997 science-fiction film Gattaca tells the story of Vincent Free-
man, a “God-child,” “de-gene-erate,” “faith birth.”  The film unfolds in a
not-too-distant future where genetic modification is commonplace and
children’s characteristics and predispositions are routinely decided
before birth.  A rarity in this world, Vincent is conceived without any
genetic modification and, consequently, is born with myopia and a con-
genital heart defect.  His inferior genetic profile has banished him to a
new subclass of society, so the only way to achieve his lifelong dream of
becoming an astronaut is by impersonating a “valid”—a person with a
healthy, genetically-engineered DNA.2
A hypothetical future?  Recent developments suggest not.  In June
of 2013, the United Kingdom drafted regulations that green-light a new
genetic technology: three-parent in vitro fertilization (“three-parent
IVF”).3  Genetic material from an egg’s nucleus is transferred into the
egg of a second, enucleated egg, and then the resulting, hybrid egg is
fertilized.4  This “pioneering” genetic technique promises to eradicate
diseases caused by mitochondrial mutations in cells, such as heart and
liver diseases, muscular dystrophy, and respiratory problems.5  If the
British Parliament approves these regulations, the United Kingdom
would become the first country in the world to permit this genetic
technique.6
But with such promise, why do many urge caution?7  Three-parent
IVF is a therapeutic form of human germ line genetic modification
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015.  I am grateful to Professor O. Carter Snead for his
feedback and suggestions.  And special thanks to my parents and Robin—I owe any suc-
cess to your perpetual love and support.  I love you all.
1. GATTACA (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1998).
2. See id.
3. Laura Smith-Spark, UK Takes Step Toward “Three-Parent Babies,” CNN.COM (June
28, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/28/health/uk-health-dna-ivf/index.html.
4. Id.; see also Part II.A, infra.
5. Smith-Spark, supra note 3. R
6. The British Parliament is scheduled to vote on these regulations in 2014. Id.
7. See, e.g., id. (“University of Notre Dame law professor O. Carter Snead, a
bioethicist, who specializes in the governance of science, medicine and biotechnology,
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(“HGGM”),8 a category of genetic modification characterized by
manipulation of either the human sex cells or a fertilized egg.9  If the
embryo is brought to term, the genetic modifications are irreversible—
they will propagate throughout the rest of that person’s hereditary line.
Naturally this rouses the ire of the pro-life movement, which recog-
nizes personhood at the moment of conception.10  This camp under-
standably opposes HGGM because it involves the creation, testing, and
likely destruction of many embryos.11  But detractors and supporters of
three-parent IVF are not necessarily pro-life and pro-choice, respec-
tively, because HGGM raises ethical questions distinct from those in the
abortion debate.  As one pro-choice writer warned, “[I]t doesn’t, and
shouldn’t necessarily, follow that any ethical issue raised by the modifi-
urged the United Kingdom to ‘proceed slowly and cautiously’ given the ‘unresolved safety
and ethical questions’ around the new technique.”); IVF ‘Designer Babies’ and “Three-Parent
Babies” Raise Serious Ethical Questions, INFOWARS.COM (July 8, 2013), http://www.infowars
.com/ivf-designer-babies-and-three-parent-babies-raise-serious-ethical-questions/; Hilary
White, Stop ‘Eugenic’ Creation of 3-Parent Embryos: Council of Europe Members to Britain,
LIFESITENEWS.COM (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/stop-eugenic-crea-
tion-of-3-parent-embryos-council-of-europe-members-to-brit.
8. Marcy Darnovsky, A Slippery Slope to Human Germline Modification, 499 NATURE 127
(2013).  The acronym is borrowed, with thanks, from Nancy Pham. See Nancy Pham,
Choice v. Chance: The Constitutional Case for Regulating Human Germline Genetic Modification,
34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 133 (2006).
9. Pham, supra note 8, at 134. R
10. See, e.g., Rebecca Taylor, Creation of Human Embryos With Three Parents Facing Mas-
sive Opposition, LIFENEWS.COM (Oct. 27, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2013/
10/27/creation-of-human-embryos-with-three-parents-facing-massive-opposition/; Isobel
Losseff, Three-parent Embryo Technique is ‘Unethical and Macabre’, Says Pro-Life Group,
CATHOLICHERALD.CO.UK (June 28, 2013), http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2013/
06/28/three-parent-embryo-technique-is-unethical-and-macabre-says-pro-life-group/.  For
a powerful argument that life and personhood begins at the moment of conception, see
Maureen L. Condic & Richard John Neuhaus, When Does Human Life Begin?: A Scientific
Perspective, THE WESTCHESTER INSTITUTE (Oct. 2008), http://bdfund.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/wi_whitepaper_life_print.pdf.
11. In March 2004, the President’s Council on Bioethics released Reproduction and
Responsibility, a comprehensive report that investigated recent advances in biomedical
technology and explored “the ethical and policy questions related to these develop-
ments.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPROD. & RESPONSIBILITY, at xxvii (2004).
There, the Council admitted that while embryo research has the potential to benefit mil-
lions of lives, it is still connected to a number of basic ethical issues.
The chief ethical concerns raised by the practice of human embryo research
arise from the fact that such research generally necessitates the use and destruc-
tion of human embryos.  Many people regard embryos as human beings at the
earliest stage of life, and thus worthy of the same respect and protections that we
afford all human persons.  Even among many who do not assign human
embryos the moral standing of “full persons,” intentional destruction of develop-
ing human life is a cause for some ethical disquiet.  To regard developing
human life as a mere means—even a means to a noble end, such as the allevia-
tion of suffering—presents a moral problem with potentially serious conse-
quences for society as a whole.
Id. at 126–27.
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cation of human genetic material is A-OK, part of the pro-choice
package.”12
To begin with, three-parent IVF is a nascent technology.  It is still
in development, and many children conceived through the procedure
could very well suffer health defects.13  Not only is it difficult to manip-
ulate genetic material with precision, but it is nigh impossible to deter-
mine what effects those changes will have.14  A single modification
could cause a ripple effect with destructive consequences.
Moreover, HGGM might alter the parent-child relationship in
unhealthy ways.15  As the products of choice—not chance—children
might experience decreased autonomy because “a parent’s determina-
tion of what constitutes the ‘best’ characteristics may not be the ideal
characteristics for the child.”16  Children might also experience
increased pressures to meet parental expectations,17 and failure to
meet those standards might lead the child to suffer damaging psycho-
logical effects.18  Meanwhile, parents might begin to view children
resulting from HGGM as “more like products of a designed manufac-
12. Zoe Williams, Are Three-Parent Babies the First Step Towards a Blade Runner Future?,
THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
jun/28/three-parent-babies-blade-runner.
13. Not only could the direct products of three-parent IVF be harmed, but their
heirs might be as well.  “[T]he impact of tinkering with cells at that level may not be
completely evident for years or even generations . . . .”  Ariana Eunjung Cha & Sandhya
Somashekhar, FDA Panel Debates Technique that Would Create Embryos with Three Genetic Par-
ents, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/fda-panel-debates-technique-that-would-create-embryos-with-three-genetic-
parents/2014/02/25/60371c58-9e4d-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html.
14. HGGM is extremely risky because researchers are still unable to precisely con-
trol how they are actually modifying the human genome. See Michael J. Reiss, What Sort of
People Do We Want? The Ethics of Changing People Through Genetic Engineering, 13 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 63, 80–81 (1999).  As a result, modification might end up
damaging the genetic material, leading the born person to suffer from unforeseen dis-
eases or disorders. Id.  Though improvement in the technology might eventually reduce
this concern, many are likely to suffer until then.
15. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 11, at 95 (arguing against R
practices that might normalize “the idea that a child’s particular genetic make-up” lies
within the ambit of parental reproductive choice).
16. Sarah M. Markwood, Creating a Perfect Human Is Not So Perfect: The Case for Restrict-
ing Genetic Enhancement Research, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 473, 483 (2005) (predicting that this
would jeopardize the child’s “individual personhood”); see also Maxwell J. Mehlman, How
Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 681 (1999) (character-
izing personal autonomy as threatened because traits—which will last into adulthood—
are foisted upon the child without her consent).
17. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 11, at 96.  The President’s R
Council on Bioethics further weighed in on this possible shift in parental perspective:
The introduction of rigorous genetic screening into childbearing might set a
new standard for what counts as an acceptable birth.  The attitude of parents
toward their child may be subtly shifted from unconditional acceptance toward
critical scrutiny: the very first act of parenting could become not the unreserved
welcoming of an arriving child, but the judging of his or her fitness, while still an
embryo, to become one’s child, all by the standards of contemporary genetic
screening.
Id. at 98.
18. Markwood, supra note 16, at 483.  Michael J. Reiss predicts some of the tension R
between a child resulting from HGGM and her parents:
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turing process than ‘gifts’ whom their parents are prepared to accept as
they are.”19
There are also broader concerns.  For one thing, access to modifi-
cation could artificially increase the “average” level of achievement.
If a child’s intellect could be enhanced through [HGGM], the
average level of intellectual capability would continue to increase,
genetic enhancement procedures would become increasingly
refined, and parents would use the procedures to ensure that
their children were at the highest possible level of intellect.20
And at the outset, “ordering” a genetically “ideal” child will likely carry
a steep price tag.21  As the average increases, those unable to afford the
fruits of HGGM will be left behind, and income inequality may yield to
a new achievement inequality.  This could magnify social disparity and
prejudice between the affluent, genetically-modified rank and the
lower-income, naturally-conceived file,22 eventually ushering in a new
era of eugenics.23
Current regulation of HGGM is sparse.  No federal or state legisla-
tion specifically governs this advanced reproductive technology, and
federal oversight through the National Institute of Health (“NIH”) and
[O]ne can imagine arguments between genetically engineered children and
their parents, with great unhappiness sometimes resulting: “We didn’t pay for
you to be musically gifted just to have you spend all your time playing baseball”
or “We didn’t pay for you to be an outstanding baseball player just to have you
spend all your time in a rock band.”
Reiss, supra note 14, at 85. R
19. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN
ETHICAL INQUIRY, at xxix (2002).  However, Prof. Sonia M. Suter believes that these con-
cerns are overblown:
The mere fact that individuals are interested in “improving” the birth of their
children does not in and of itself mean that reproduction and the child will be
commodified, or worse, that they will be solely viewed as a commodity. Simply
because parents try to control the outcome of reproduction, rather than to allow
things to happen “naturally,” does not preclude them from viewing their chil-
dren as a gift.
Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 961
(2007) [hereinafter Suter, A Brave New World].
20. Markwood, supra note 16, at 484 (citing Cynthia B. Cohen & LeRoy Walters, R
Gene Transfer for Therapy or Enhancement, in A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO NEW GENETICS 68
(David B. Smith & Cynthia B. Cohen eds., 2003)).
21. Even in vitro fertilization—which has been available for decades—is still out of
reach for many Americans.  The American Society of Reproductive Medicine lists the
average price of an IVF cycle at $12,400, and this cost is usually not covered by insurance.
The Costs of Infertility Treatment, RESOLVE: THE NATIONAL INFERTILITY ASSOCIATION, http://
www.resolve.org/family-building-options/insurance_coverage/the-costs-of-infertility-treat-
ment.html.
22. See Mehlman, supra note 16, at 687 (“[U]nequal access to genetic enhancement R
will divide society into the enhanced and the un-enhanced.  Germ cell enhancement will
perpetuate enhancements from generation to generation, creating a hereditary aristoc-
racy or ‘genobility.’”).
23. See, e.g., Markwood, supra note 16, at 485–86.  However, not all necessarily see R
this as undesirable. See Suter, A Brave New World, supra note 19, at 898 (distinguishing R
what Prof. Suter calls “neoeugenics”—the use of reproductive technologies to create
“good births”—from the horrors of classic eugenics).
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the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is limited.24  Of these, the
FDA’s regulatory power is relatively more potent25 because developers
of HGGM techniques must receive the FDA’s approval, a process that
includes searching review of the method’s safety and efficacy as well as
satisfactory completion of human trials.26
Furthermore, approval of three-parent IVF in the United States
appears imminent as researchers place increasing pressure on the
FDA.27  In October 2013 the FDA met in Silver Spring, Maryland to
discuss the ethical, health, and safety issues implicated by three-parent
IVF.28  And in February 2014 an FDA panel considered whether to
allow researchers to proceed with human trials.29
Given the lack of meaningful regulation and escalating pressure,
Congress cannot remain silent for long—it must decide both whether
and how to regulate HGGM.  And when it does, one option is to pro-
hibit access to both therapeutic and non-therapeutic HGGM.30  Assum-
ing that such legislation has passed, this Note looks ahead to the
inevitable constitutionality challenges.  It asserts that courts should (1)
analyze a right of access to HGGM as a substantive due process right;
(2) review the legislation under the rational basis test; and (3) uphold
the restriction.31  Part II provides background information on the rele-
vant reproductive techniques and reviews the legal framework for judi-
cial review.  Part III (1) argues that a right of access to HGGM finds its
strongest support in the doctrine of substantive due process; and (2)
24. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 11, at 110; Germline Gene Transfer, R
NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Mar. 2006), http://www.genome.gov/
10004764.
25. Operating within the NIH is the Recombinant DNA Advisory Council (RAC),
which considers the ethical implications of novel genetic modification techniques.  The
RAC, which makes recommendations to the NIH’s director about which genetic modifica-
tion methods should receive federal funding, has “ruled it would not evaluate germ-line
engineering proposals and would only consider approving proposals that involved
somatic gene engineering.”  Markwood, supra note 16, at 479; see also PRESIDENT’S COUN- R
CIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 11, at 114–16.  However, this control is worth little because R
researchers can be privately funded.  Markwood, supra note 16, at 479. R
26. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 11, at 112. R
27. Erika Check Hayden, Regulators Weigh Benefits of ‘Three-Parent’ Fertilization, 502
NATURE 284, 284 (2013).  As a practical matter, though, three-parent IVF is still in its
infancy—Mitalipov detected genetic abnormalities in about half of the created embryos.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Cha & Somashekar, supra note 13. R
30. This Note does not delve into whether Congress has authority to pass such legis-
lation.  But all indications are that this prohibition would likely be upheld as a constitu-
tional exercise of the Commerce Clause power. See Jason C. Glahn, I Teach You the
Superman: Why Congress Cannot Constitutionally Prohibit Genetic Modification, 25 WHITTIER L.
REV. 409, 422–23 (2003).
31. Though others have discussed the constitutionality of a prohibition on HGGM,
this Note more forcefully advocates a certain mode of analysis and a particular result.  In
contrast, Nancy Pham’s thoughtful article considers what the Court is likely to do but takes
no position on what the Court should do. See Pham, supra note 8; compare id. at 148 (con- R
cluding that a prohibition on non-therapeutic HGGM is most likely to survive a constitu-
tionality challenge) with Glahn, supra note 30, at 411 (arguing that the Constitution R
protects access to both therapeutic and non-therapeutic HGGM).
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charts the proper analysis.  Applying this analysis, Part IV then con-
cludes that the hypothetical legislation should be upheld because there
is no fundamental right of access to HGGM.  Finally, Part V concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Human Germ Line Genetic Modification (HGGM)
We humans are considered multicellular eukaryotes because our
bodies are composed of trillions of cells, each cell housing a nucleus
with our genetic material.32  These cells are grouped into two primary
categories: somatic cells, which form body parts and organs; and germ
cells (gametes), which are reproductive cells—in humans, egg and
sperm cells.33  Both types of cells contain a variety of organelles, or
structures that allow the cell to survive and carry on the processes of
life.34  One such organelle is the mitochondrion, which is known as a
“miniature power plant” because it uses oxygen to break down sub-
stances and create energy for the cell.35
Somatic and germ cells store most genetic material within the
nucleus.36  There, deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) is gathered into
tightly-packed bunches known as chromosomes.37  Generally, the num-
ber of chromosomes is the same for all somatic cells in each organism
of a species—for instance, all human somatic cells contain forty-six
chromosomes.38  An organism’s germ cells typically contain half the
number of chromosomes as the somatic cells—in humans, twenty-
three.39  Thus, when two germ cells (i.e., the sperm and the egg) com-
bine in the process of fertilization, the resultant cell—called a
zygote40—has that organism’s required number of chromosomes.  This
zygote is neither a somatic nor germ cell; it remains an undifferenti-
ated, totipotent cell—or, once it divides, a clump of totipotent cells
called an embryo—for several weeks into pregnancy.41  But while an
32. See ELAINE JOHANSEN MANGE & ARTHUR P. MANGE, BASIC HUMAN GENETICS 16–17
(2d ed. 1999).
33. Id. at 17.
34. Id.  Organelles comprise cells; cells comprise organs; organs comprise organ
systems; organ systems comprise the human body.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 16.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 34.
41. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, MONITORING STEM CELL RESEARCH: A
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 157–80 (2004).  Some maintain that a
zygote should not be considered an embryo until at least one cell division has occurred.
See, e.g., J.K. Findlay et al., Human Embryo: A Biological Definition, 22 HUMAN REPROD. 905
(2007).  Yet Maureen Condic has presented strong evidence that accepted scientific con-
ventions demand that a zygote be considered an embryo from the moment of fertiliza-
tion. See Maureen L. Condic, When Does Human Life Begin?  The Scientific Evidence and
Terminology Revisited, 8 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 44 (2013) (arguing that the zygote
is a unicellular human embryo—a viable human life).
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organism’s nuclear DNA is a combination of its parents’ germ cell
DNA, that organism’s mitochondrial DNA is not.
Compared to all other organelles, mitochondria are unique in that
they contain a small amount of their own genetic material42 called
mitochondrial DNA (“mtDNA”).43  All mtDNA in an embryo comes
from the egg only—though the tail section of sperm cells contain mito-
chondria, the father’s mtDNA is excluded during the zygote’s forma-
tion.44  In other words, individuals inherit mtDNA directly—and
exclusively—from their mothers.45
Mutations in either nuclear or mitochondrial DNA can lead to dis-
ease,46 and certain mutations can be passed on to offspring.  Accord-
ingly, there has recently been an explosion in research on genetic
modification, or gene therapy, which promises to treat these inherited
and acquired diseases.47   The underlying principle is simple: to “intro-
duce into target cells a piece of [‘fixed’] genetic material that will result
in either a cure for the disease or a slowdown in the progression of the
disease.”48  Rather than alleviating the symptoms or damage of the
genetic disease, gene therapy seeks to cure the basic defect.49
42. NEIL A. CAMPBELL & JANE B. REECE, BIOLOGY 124 (6th ed. 2002).  A single cell
contains many mitochondria, and each mitochondrion may house dozens of copies of its
own DNA.  Heidi Chial & Joanna Craig, mtDNA and Mitochondrial Diseases, NATURE (2008),
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/mtdna-and-mitochondrial-diseases-903.
43. Mitochondrial DNA, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (May 2013), http://ghr.nlm.nih
.gov/mitochondrial-dna.  One of the leading theories for mitochondrial DNA was first
advanced by Russian biologist C. Mereschkovsky.  He theorized that mitochondria were
originally bacteria living within single-celled organisms.  The bacteria probably entered
the cell first as undigested prey or as internal parasites, but over time the two formed a
symbiotic relationship. See CAMPBELL & REECE, supra note 42, at 549–50. R
44. MANGE & MANGE, supra note 32, at 262. R
45. Chial & Craig, supra note 42. R
46. See, e.g., Jordan S. Orange et al., Human Disease Resulting from Gene Mutations that
Interfere with Appropriate Nuclear Factor-kB Activation, 203 IMMUNOLOGICAL REVIEWS 21
(2005) (nuclear DNA disease); Robert W. Taylor & Doug M. Turnbull, Mitochondrial DNA
Mutations in Human Disease, 6 NATURE REVIEWS 389, 389 (2005) (mitochondrial DNA dis-
ease).  Note that most diseases are caused by polygenic mutations—mutations in more
than one gene.  But there are a handful of genetic diseases that are caused by a single
mutation on the chromosome.  Chial & Craig, supra note 42.  For a non-exhaustive list of R
nuclear genetic disorders, see Genetic Disease Related Diseases & Conditions, MEDICINENET
.COM, http://www.medicinenet.com/genetic_disease/related-conditions/index.htm.  A
list of known mitochondrial diseases can be found at Conditions Related to Mitochondrial
Genes, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (May 2013), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/mitochondrial-
dna/show/Conditions.
47. Inder M. Verma & Matthew D. Weitzman, Gene Therapy: Twenty-First Century
Medicine, 74 ANNU. REV. BIOCHEMISTRY 711, 711 (2005).
48. Id. at 712.  Introducing genetic material occurs through the use of vectors—
delivery “vehicles” which ferry snippets of genetic material into a strain of DNA. Id.; Gene
Delivery: Tools of the Trade, LEARN.GENETICS, http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/
genetherapy/gttools/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2014).  Along with identifying the genes that
are responsible for various traits and diseases, one of the largest challenges to widespread
use of HGGM is the development of safe, effective vectors.  Verma & Weitzman, supra
note 47, at 712. R
49. MANGE & MANGE, supra note 32, at 443. R
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Corresponding to the two types of cells, there are two types of
genetic modification: somatic and germ line modification.50  The for-
mer, which naturally involves manipulation of somatic cells, affects only
the modified cells and any other cells that descend from them.51  Thus,
somatic gene therapy is noninheritable: “A recipient does not pass the
genetic correction to offspring.”52  Contrast human germ line genetic
modification (HGGM), where the DNA of a germ cell or fertilized
ovum is altered.  The defining characteristic of germ line modification is
that any changes made to the DNA are passed to offspring.53
Germ line genetic modification can be further subdivided into
therapeutic modification and non-therapeutic modification.  Therapeu-
tic genetic modification refers to any alteration of the human genome
that is intended to eliminate negative traits such as genetic abnormali-
ties and disease.54  Non-therapeutic genetic modification would include
any other use of gene-altering technology,55 including enhancement
modifications that add helpful traits like improved intelligence or
athleticism.56
Abnormalities in mtDNA are associated with certain heritable dis-
eases, affecting an estimated one in four thousand children.57  Though
rare, these diseases can often be fatal.58  And if a mother’s mitochon-
dria carry the mutation, then her offspring will certainly receive it.59
50. Id.
51. RICKI LEWIS, HUMAN GENETICS: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 402 (8th ed. 2008).
52. Id. at 395.
53. Id.; Maxine F. Singer, Genetics and the Law: A Scientist’s View, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 315, 329 (1985) (“A critical difference between them is that changes made in germ-
line manipulation will be passed on to future generations while somatic changes are lost
when the recipient individual dies.”).
54. Pham, supra note 8, at 148. R
55. Id.  The National Institute of Health (NIH) sheds further light on the concept
of genetic enhancement:
In general, genetic enhancement refers to the transfer of genetic material
intended to modify nonpathological [non-disease-related] human traits. The
term commonly is used to describe efforts to make someone not just well, but
better than well, by optimizing attributes or capabilities—perhaps by raising an
individual from standard to peak levels of performance.
Genetic Enhancement, NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (2006), http://www
.genome.gov/10004767.
56. Pham, supra note 8, at 148; see also Genetic Enhancement, supra note 55 R
(“[G]enetic enhancement refers to the transfer of genetic material intended to modify
nonpathological human traits.  The term commonly is used to describe efforts to make
someone not just well, but better than well, by optimizing attributes or capabilities.”).
57. David Cyranoski, DNA-Swap Technology Almost Ready for Fertility Clinic, NATURE
(Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/nature.2012.11651.  Note,
though, that both mitochondrial and nuclear DNA can be mutated through the process
of cell division.  However, this natural mutation is 100 times more likely for mtDNA than
for nuclear DNA.  Moreover, it is typically not passed on to offspring.  Chial & Craig, supra
note 42. R
58. Cyranoski, supra note 57. R
59. In humans, mtDNA is always inherited from a person’s mother.  Chial & Craig,
supra note 42. R
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Researchers developed three-parent in vitro fertilization (“three-
parent IVF”), a form of therapeutic HGGM,60 to eliminate these
defects.61  The principle is simple: increase the number of healthy
pregnancies by replacing defective egg cell mitochondria with healthy
mitochondria.62  This has been accomplished with at least two different
techniques.63
The first technique begins with two unfertilized eggs—one with
mutated mitochondria and one with healthy mitochondria.  First, the
egg with mutated mitochondria is enucleated—its nucleus, which con-
tains that mother’s nuclear DNA, is removed.  Along with its abnormal
mtDNA, the cell remainder is destroyed.  Second, an unfertilized egg
with healthy mitochondria is enucleated.  Here, though, the nucleus is
destroyed and the cell remainder, including the healthy mtDNA, is
retained.  Third, the nucleus from the first cell is inserted into the
remains of the second cell.  This produces a unique cell housing the
genetic material from two mothers: the nuclear DNA of the first mother
and the mtDNA of the second mother.  Fourth, the hybrid egg cell is
fertilized with sperm, contributing the genetic material of a third par-
ent.  Finally, since all prior steps are conducted in vitro, the fertilized
zygote is implanted in a woman’s uterine wall.64
The second method is similar but begins with fertilization of both
eggs (one egg with mutated mitochondria and one egg with healthy
mitochondria).  Next, the embryo with healthy mitochondria is enucle-
ated, and the nucleus is destroyed.  Then the embryo with mutated
mitochondria is enucleated, the nucleus is retained, and the embryo
remains and mtDNA is destroyed.  After that, the retained nucleus is
inserted into the remains of the embryo with healthy mitochondria.
Again, the procedure ends when the composite embryo is implanted in
a woman’s uterine wall.65
A team led by Shoukhrat Mitalipov, a reproductive biologist at Ore-
gon Health and Science University in Beaverton, has already used the
first technique to create healthy rhesus monkeys.66  Tracked through-
out their lives, these monkeys exhibited no long-term health issues.67
Mitalipov’s team has also begun researching the use of three-parent IVF
to create viable human embryos.68  Initial results are less than promis-
60. Darnovsky, supra note 8, at 127. R
61. Smith-Spark, supra note 3. R
62. Cyranoski, supra note 57. R
63. See James Gallagher, Three-Person Babies “In Two Years” – Says Science Review, BBC
NEWS (June 3, 2014, 8:11 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-27678464.
64. See Cyranoski, supra note 57; Gallagher, supra note 63. R
65. See Gallagher, supra note 63.  This method raises even more ethical issues than R
the first because it involves the creation and destruction of two viable embryos.
66. Cyranoski, supra note 57. R
67. Id.
68. David Cryanoski explains that though the research is not currently conducted
with public funds, three-parent IVF might change this:
The US National Institutes [sic.] of Health (NIH) restricts funding for research
that destroys human embryos, so Mitalipov had to do his work with money from
private sources, and in a “mirror laboratory” that shared no resources with his
NIH-funded research. However, work in the clinic will create eggs that are not
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ing, though—half of the fertilized hybrid egg cells were unfit for
implantation.69
Seeking to refine the technique, Mitalipov has led the charge for
clinical trials of three-parent IVF in the United States.70  Approval for
these trials must come from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), which has asserted authority over reproductive technology
research.71  In January of 2013, Mitalipov submitted an application
seeking this approval, but he has thus far been met with silence.  Says
Mitalipov, “The ball is on their side of the court.  We just want their
guidance.  Unfortunately the patients are waiting.”72
B. The Legal Framework for Judicial Review
The Bill of Rights entitles individuals to certain protections.  In
addition to the rights expressly protected, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that there are unenumerated, yet equally fundamental, rights
protected by the Constitution.73  Through the power of judicial review,
courts can, under certain circumstances, strike down legislation that
impermissibly violates those rights.74  Thus, courts must carefully con-
sider whether the challenged regulation burdens an express or
unenumerated right.  The significance of this threshold issue cannot be
overstated because it affects the level of scrutiny that courts apply.  Fun-
damental rights are not absolute; they can be burdened by government
action.  But if so, courts review the constitutionality of that action under
a more rigorous standard of review.
meant to be destroyed, so might be eligible for public money. “Now the ques-
tions is: will the NIH fund the clinical research?” asks a somewhat exasperated
Mitalipov.
Id.
69. Id. It is unclear why this is so.  Mitalipov hypothesizes that as compared to rhe-
sus monkeys, human germ cells are more “sensitive” and that the problem may be caused
by “incomplete meiosis,” a faulty splitting of the cells.  He is currently working to alleviate
this problem. Id.
70. Id.
71. B. Jason Erb outlines the basis of the FDA’s authority over reproductive
technologies:
On January 20, 1998, in response to the potential physical risks to women and
children, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced its intentions to
regulate human cloning under section 351 of the Public Health and Service Act
(PHSA). . . . The FDA proposal to regulate cell and tissue-based products was
intended to: (1) prevent the use of contaminated tissue; (2) prevent mishan-
dling that might contaminate the tissue; and (3) ensure clinical safety for tissue
that is more than minimally manipulated.
B. Jason Erb, Deconstructing the Human Egg: The FDA’s Regulation of Scientifically Created
Babies, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 273, 274–75 (1999) (citing Rick Weiss, Human Clone
Research Will be Regulated, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1998; FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
PROPOSED APPROACH TO REGULATION OF CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS 6 (1997)).
72. Cyranoski, supra note 57. R
73. GREGORY E. MAGGS & PETER J. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 615–16 (2d ed. 2011).
74. Id. at 102; see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down
a Connecticut law which forbade the use of contraceptives because the law violated sub-
stantive due process under the 14th Amendment).
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Courts generally apply one of three levels of scrutiny when decid-
ing issues of constitutionality.  The most deferential standard is rational
basis review—“legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained”
if it is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”75  Legislation
subjected to this standard is all but certain to be held constitutional.76
Intermediate scrutiny, the second standard, is usually limited to chal-
lenges that invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.77  Here there is no colorable Equal Protection argument for a
right of access to HGGM, so courts should not apply intermediate scru-
tiny.  Strict scrutiny, the third and most demanding standard of judicial
review, is triggered when courts identify a “fundamental right” that is
burdened.78  In order to pass constitutional muster, the government
action or regulation must meet three requirements.  First, it must serve
a “compelling governmental interest”; second, it must be “narrowly tai-
lored” to further that interest; and third, it must be the “least restrictive
means” for achieving that interest.79  Conventional wisdom has it that
strict scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal in fact,”80 and, even though
some have challenged this adage,81 there is no denying it: when chal-
lenged government action is subjected to rational basis rather than
strict scrutiny, it is far more likely to survive.
Thus, the constitutionality of prohibiting access to therapeutic and
non-therapeutic HGGM hinges, in large part, on whether courts are to
75. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
76. MAGGS & SMITH, supra note 73, at 528–29 (“[Rational basis] is a highly deferen- R
tial form of review, and it virtually always results in a conclusion that the challenged regu-
lation is valid.”).  This is grounded in courts’ reluctance to “‘substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws,’
regardless of whether the laws are ‘wise or unwise.’” Id. at 529 (quoting Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–32 (1963)).
77. Professors Gregory E. Maggs and Peter J. Smith explain intermediate scrutiny:
Government decisions that classify on the basis of gender are subject to interme-
diate scrutiny.  This level of scrutiny requires a justification that is “exceedingly
persuasive” and will be upheld only if the government can demonstrate that “the
[challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives.”
MAGGS & SMITH, supra note 73, at 777 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, R
516 (1996)).
78. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 503–04 (1965) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).  Strict
scrutiny is also triggered when government action applies to a “suspect classification,”
such as laws that discriminate on the basis of race or national origin. MAGGS & SMITH,
supra note 73, at 776 (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)). R
79. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56 (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved,
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compel-
ling state interest,’ . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interests at stake.”).
80. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
81. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 797 (2006) (calling this a “popular
myth” because “laws can (and do) survive strict scrutiny with considerable frequency”).
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review it under rational basis review or strict scrutiny.82  And this, in
turn, depends on whether there is a “fundamental right” of access to
this technology.  Legislation that prohibits therapeutic and non-thera-
peutic HGGM affects too broad a swath of activity to be considered
“narrowly tailored.”  So if a court holds that a fundamental right is bur-
dened, then the legislation likely will not pass strict scrutiny.  On the
flip side, many “legitimate state interests” are conceivably furthered by
restricting access to HGGM.83  Hence, if a court finds no fundamental
right encumbered, then the legislation will presumably be upheld.84
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT
TO GENETICALLY MODIFY
A. Human Germ Cells
Those challenging a prohibition on access to HGGM must estab-
lish that the legislation deprives them of a fundamental right, a right
that might be predicated on a number of bases.  One potential source
of the right is the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.85  But
82. Indeed, this finding triggers a presumption that is, in truth, more-or-less
dispositive:
[I]f the claimed right ranks as fundamental, courts will apply some form of
heightened scrutiny and insist upon a demonstration of exceptional public need
for the incursion. By contrast, if the burdened interest is classified merely as an
ordinary or non-fundamental aspect of liberty, the state’s incursion is presumed
to be constitutional, subject only to the minimal demands of rational basis
review.
David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 456 (2004) (citation
omitted).
83. See Pham, supra note 8, at 146–49 (insisting that the compelling state interests R
furthered by a blanket prohibition on HGGM include protection of the physical and psy-
chological health of children and preserving the sanctity of life); Markwood, supra note
16, at 489–91 (asserting that regulation of genetic enhancement serves compelling gov- R
ernment interests because the technology threatens harm to individual children as well as
our society’s democratic values at large); Amber Stine, The Implications of the Due Process
Clause on the Future of Human Embryonic Gene Therapy, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 507, 525 (2003)
(citations omitted) (“There is probably a compelling state interest in preserving genetic
diversity given the Court’s prior decisions indicating that a state interest in the unborn
can be compelling and given authoritative statements that a decrease in the gene pool
may interfere with human adaptability to the environment”); but see Glahn, supra note 30, R
at 425 (citations omitted) (admitting that a prohibition on genetic modification could
serve legitimate government interests like the “desire to ensure genetic diversity” and “the
desire to preserve an egalitarian society devoid of a genetic gap between the rich and the
poor,” but rejecting that these interests are “compelling”).  With regard to the genetic
diversity interest, Amber Stine believes that while a ban on non-therapeutic HGGM would
be rationally related to this interest, a ban on therapeutic HGGM would not.  However,
this view purports to know what traits will be necessary to survival in the future.  The
Earth’s environment could change dramatically, and some genetic aberrations that cau se
disease today may be useful to survival in the future.  Rather than pretend that we can
separate the necessary from unnecessary genetic modifications, courts should err on the
side of caution: they should rule that a prohibition on both therapeutic and non-thera-
peutic HGGM is rationally related to preserving genetic diversity.
84. Pham, supra note 8, at 142 (“[Rational basis] is a very deferential standard R
which merely questions whether a law is irrational or arbitrary.”).
85. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, Three Legal Frameworks for Regulating Genetic Technology, 19
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 21–22 (2003); but see Glahn, supra note 30, at 424–25. R
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even those who reject restrictions on access to HGGM as unconstitu-
tional admit that the First Amendment is a fragile peg on which to hang
constitutional protection.86  Because a right of access to HGGM fails
the relevant free speech tests, and because compelling policy reasons
counsel against extending free speech protection to cover this scientific
research, the First Amendment is a poor source of cover.87  Therefore,
this Note studies two other bases for a constitutionally-protected right
of access to HGGM: the Ninth88 and Fifth/Fourteenth Amendments.89
B. The Ninth Amendment
One argument justifying access to HGGM is that it is protected by
the Ninth Amendment,90 which states: “The enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.”91  In Griswold v. Connecticut,92 Justice
Goldberg famously wrote that “[t]he language and history of the Ninth
Amendment”—in addition to its text—reveal that it protects certain
rights that are fundamental yet unenumerated.93
But the Ninth Amendment is the sentinel, not the sire, of these
rights.  In the same opinion Justice Goldberg explicitly rejected the
notion that the Ninth Amendment “constitutes an independent source
of rights.”94  Instead, the provision “simply shows the intent of the Con-
stitution’s authors that other fundamental personal rights should not
be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way simply
because they are not specifically listed in the first eight constitutional
86. See Glahn, supra note 30, at 424–25.
87. Jason C. Glahn presents two primary reasons.  For one thing, the right to geneti-
cally modify germ lines solely for that purpose would become subordinate to the pursuit
of scientific knowledge.  This would send the message that the “state consider[ed] the
resultant children merely a means to an end”—that end being the advancement of scien-
tific knowledge.  Additionally, notes Glahn, “it would seem odd for the state to deem a
right to scientific experiment more important or fundamental than the right of parents to
raise their children.” Id. at 426.
88. See id. at 434–38.
89. Id.; see also Lawrence Wu, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is There a
Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1998) (arguing that procreation
through human cloning, which raises issues similar to HGGM, is a substantive due process
right for married couples).
90. Glahn, supra note 30, at 435–38. R
91. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
93. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  The constitutional protection of
unenumerated rights is contested, but Peter J. Smith provides some support for the pro-
position.  First, “there is little dispute that the First Amendment’s explicit protections—
for speech, religion, and so forth—also imply the existence of a ‘freedom of association,’
even though the Amendment nowhere mentions such a right.”  Additionally, most of the
provisions that grant express rights are framed at “very high levels of generality,” presum-
ing that judicial interpretation will derive secondary rights from them.  As an example,
Smith cites interpretation of the Due Process Clause to require that the government
prove criminal charges “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Finally, he notes, the Fourteenth
Amendment reference to privileges and the structure of federalism both imply certain
restraints on government action that are not explicitly acknowledged within the Constitu-
tion.  MAGGS & SMITH, supra note 73, at 615–16. R
94. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-2\NDE208.txt unknown Seq: 14 20-APR-15 16:57
536 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 29
amendments.”95  This interpretation is consistent with the majority
opinion in Roe v. Wade.96  There, the Northern District of Texas
believed that the unenumerated right of privacy was founded in the
Ninth Amendment.97  But Justice Blackmun, writing on behalf of the
majority in Roe, decided instead that this right inhered “in the Four-
teenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty”98—in other words,
the Fourteenth Amendment implied the existence of a right while the
Ninth Amendment expressly protected that right.
This distinction undermines any argument that the Ninth Amend-
ment provides freestanding protection to a right of access to HGGM.99
These arguments rely on a faulty premise: the Ninth Amendment pro-
tects some “natural” individual rights that do not necessarily inhere in
the Bill of Rights.100  For reasons above, however, this understanding is
at odds with Griswold and Roe, which reveal that unenumerated rights
must find basis outside of the Ninth Amendment.  Moreover, accepting
this premise would lay far more power in the hands of unelected
judges.  However tenuous the history and tradition analysis is, it at least
anchors constitutional interpretation in some earth; the Ninth Amend-
ment premise, though, severs the anchor line and sets the boat adrift.
Under guise of interpreting the “natural” rights protected by the Ninth
Amendment, judges could essentially write constitutional law.  Hence,
to jettison the history and tradition analysis is to multiply judicial discre-
tion.  Absent more consistent agreement on which—if any—unenumer-
ated rights the Ninth Amendment protects, courts should adopt the
narrower approach advocated by Justice Goldberg in Griswold.
Alternatively, some have proposed a broader interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment that would protect the right to engage in any activity
that does not violate the harm principle.101  The harm principle states
that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suffi-
cient warrant.”102  Because the Ninth Amendment should be “viewed as
protecting individual actions that do not pose a threat of harm to one-
self or to others,” the argument goes, access to HGGM should be pro-
tected.103  However, even this broad reading does not sustain a right of
95. Id.
96. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
97. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
98. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
99. See, e.g., Glahn, supra note 30. R
100. Glahn, supra note 30, at 434 (citations omitted); but see Eric M. Axler, Note, R
The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The Restoration of the People’s Unenumerated
Rights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 431, 469–71 (2000) (arguing persuasively that, in addition
to rights inherent to the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment was originally intended to
protect Lockian natural law rights, which were mentioned in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence’s Preamble).
101. See Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69
IND. L.J. 759, 806–17 (1994); see also Glahn, supra note 30, at 435–38. R
102. Glahn, supra note 30, at 436 n.132 (citation omitted). R
103. Id. at 437; see also Sanders, supra note 101, at 806–17. R
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access to HGGM.  According to Chase J. Sanders, “the Ninth Amend-
ment protects the right to engage in any activity which entails no threat
of substantive physical or economic harm to either the actor or others.”104
But genetic modification of the human germ line raises ethical issues—
such as unforeseen diseases and increased income inequality—that
directly implicate physical and economic harm to the human popula-
tion, regardless of whether the technology has been perfected or
not.105  Hence, a right of access to HGGM violates the harm principle
and cannot be supported by this understanding of the Ninth
Amendment.
C. Alternative Standards of Review
In addition to the traditional, three-tiered judicial review—com-
prised of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny106—
the Supreme Court has employed other standards in its substantive due
process analysis.  This makes it difficult to pinpoint which might be
used.107  One option is Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s “undue burden”
standard.108  The Court explained that an “undue burden” exists when
“a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.”109  On its face this standard seems limited to government
restraints on women seeking abortions.  Yet, some argue that “access to
HGGM [is] a right on par with the right to abortion” because both
implicate pre-viability decision-making ability.110
Nancy Pham responds that “the language of the Court’s decisions
to date casts doubt on whether it would equate the two rights.”111  In
addition to procreative liberty, she emphasizes that Roe and Casey were
decided on the principle of “bodily integrity.”112  On this basis, Pham
distinguishes access to abortion and access to HGGM:
Unlike the right to abortion, without which a woman would bear
the burden of physically carrying her child to term, a woman who
chooses HGGM would already have made the decision to bear the
burden of physically carrying her child to term.  Since HGGM
raises no bodily integrity issue, the Supreme Court has less ratio-
nale for categorizing access to HGGM as a fundamental right.113
104. Sanders, supra note 101, at 806 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). R
105. See supra text accompanying notes 13–22. R
106. See supra, Part II.B.
107. Pham, supra note 8, at 143. R
108. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (“Only
where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this deci-
sion does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.”).
109. Id. at 877.
110. Pham, supra note 8, at 143. R
111. Id. at 144.
112. Id. at 139 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 857); see also, LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL
C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73–112 (1991).
113. Pham, supra note 8, at 139. R
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However, Pham gives relatively short shrift to procreative liberty,
which arguably does far more work in Casey.114  The reaffirmation of
Roe lays on a key premise: that in pregnancy, “the liberty of the woman is
at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the
law.”115  The woman’s place is unique, the Court reasoned, because she
alone deals with the physical and emotional consequences of preg-
nancy.116  The subtext here is that the state deprives a pregnant woman
of the liberty to decide whether or not she wants to bear these conse-
quences when it places restrictions on access to abortion.
Prior to Casey—specifically, in Roe—the Court engaged in classic
substantive due process analysis and reviewed these restrictions under
strict scrutiny.  This form of review is government-centric, examining
restrictions on “fundamental rights” relative to legitimate government
interests.117  In contrast, the “undue burden” standard requires courts
to analyze government restrictions from the point of view of a woman
seeking an abortion.  This standard requires courts to strike down legis-
lation that places any “substantial obstacle” between a woman and
access to abortion.118  So, because the Casey plurality viewed pregnancy
as divesting women of liberty, it forged a more exacting standard of
review to return some liberty to those women.
This rationale is inapposite to a right of access to HGGM.  The
parent or couple seeking to genetically modify their germ line is totally
unlike the pregnant mother in Casey, who is forced to “confront[ ] the
reality that, perhaps despite her attempts to avoid it, she has become
pregnant.”119  The “undue burden” test at least returns some liberty to
pregnant mothers facing these deep “personal decisions.”120  But those
seeking access to HGGM have had time to ponder whether to have a
child—a decision fully within their control and one that entails no loss
of liberty.  Thus, courts should not analyze restrictions on access to
HGGM under the “undue burden” standard.121
114. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“[The Due Process Clause] declares that no
State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’
The controlling word . . . before us is ‘liberty.’”).  Emphasis on the ineluctable concept of
“liberty” is also evident in Justice Kennedy’s well-known “mystery passage”: “At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life.” Id. at 851.
115. Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
116. See id. (“The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.”).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 78–81. R
118. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
119. Id. at 853.
120. Id.
121. This undermines Amber Stine’s argument that a ban on therapeutic HGGM
would violate substantive due process. See Stine, supra note 83, at 529.  She asserts, R
A total ban on therapeutic gene therapy would likely constitute an undue bur-
den on reproductive liberties because it would result in the government dictat-
ing to individual’s [sic] that if they are to have children, they must bear an
afflicted child with all of the accompanying the [sic] emotional, physical, and
financial hardships associated with a special needs child.
Id. Because the “undue burden” standard should not be applied to restrictions on access
to HGGM, Stine’s argument fails.
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The second option for judicial review finds support in Lawrence v.
Texas.122  Before this decision, the notorious “footnote four” of United
States v. Carolene Products Co.123 instructed lower courts to presume that
legislation is constitutional unless it is “within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution.”124  In the context of substantive due process, this
presumption was translated into a requirement that petitioners who
claim a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights bear the bur-
den of proving that the challenged statute violates a “fundamental
right.”125
But some suggest that the traditional structure of review has been
inverted.  They view cases like Lawrence and Casey as creating a new
“autonomy approach,”126 which asks whether the right, as framed, is
“one that ‘involve[s] the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy.’”127  If so, the argument goes, restrictions on that right are pre-
sumed invalid, and the government bears the burden of justifying the
restriction.128
However, Professor David D. Meyer presents compelling reasons to
read Lawrence more narrowly.  An expansive autonomy right could
reduce the government’s ability to promote normative models of family
organization and conduct:
The danger is that effectively expanding the “family” protected by
the Constitution to include all conceptions of intimacy that can-
122. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
123. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
124. Id. at 152–53 n.4; see also Philip Chapman, Note, Beyond Gay Rights: Lawrence v.
Texas and the Promise of Liberty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 245, 247–48 (2004).
125. Chapman, supra note 124, at 248. R
126. See Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theo-
ries of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1514, 1520 (2007) [hereinafter Suter, Repugnance] (“[Under one reading of Roe,]
[r]eproductive rights . . . protect against state interference with important and intimate
decisions central to one’s personal identity and self-definition. This notion was . . . explic-
itly articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.”); Meyer, supra
note 82, at 465–74 (demonstrating that Lawrence “can be understood to articulate a grand R
and expansive right of individual autonomy” termed “a fundamental right of intimate
self-realization”); Chapman, supra note 124, at 246 (arguing “that the Supreme Court’s R
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas is an attempt to move away from the ‘fundamental rights’
analysis that has characterized the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence since
the 1938 case United States v. Carolene Products Co”); Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substan-
tive Due Process Right to In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2798 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Assessing the Viability] (“[T]he [Lawrence] Court seemed to embrace the autonomy-
based inquiry of Casey . . . .”); Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due
Process Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985, 1987
(2005) [hereinafter Last Resorts] (footnote omitted) (“Lawrence v. Texas exemplifies the
autonomy strand in the substantive due process tradition.”).
127. Assessing the Viability, supra note 126, at 2802 (alteration in original) (quoting R
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
128. See Meyer, supra note 82, at 468 (“[This reading of] Lawrence . . . seems to R
reject the idea that an individual’s claim to protection for intimate conduct turns on
some social validation of the asserted interest.  Instead, it implies that private conceptions
of intimate conduct are entitled to public deference unless the government can demon-
strate some palpable injury to others.”).
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not be deemed “harmful” will ultimately sap family of its distinc-
tive value and vitality.  If society is disabled from channeling
intimate conduct into relationships reflective of durable commit-
ment, the fulfillment of dependency, and other basic aspirational
values commonly associated with family, human interaction may
drift toward more self-centered, unstable, and transient forms.129
Further, the government would be helpless to regulate a vast array of
consensual conduct without concrete proof that the conduct causes
harm.130  By this point the harm would already have occurred, and it
would be near impossible to put the toothpaste back into the tube.
Accordingly, Professor Meyer has questioned the value of Lawrence’s
“harm” exception as a limitation and predicted that courts will interpret
this exception very narrowly.131
In light of the above, it is dangerous to apply broad autonomy
rights to modification of the human genome.  This would tie the fed-
eral government’s hands behind its back, preventing it from regulating
a technology that could have a dramatic impact on the public health.
Hence, courts should not apply the autonomy approach to presume
that restrictions on HGGM are unconstitutional.
III. APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Washington v. Glucksberg132 set forth the traditional two-prong test
for identifying those fundamental rights worthy of substantive due pro-
cess protection:
First, the Court stated that “the Due Process Clause specially pro-
tects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”  Second, the Court
stated that substantive due process protection requires “a ‘careful
description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest,” one that
129. Id. at 477.
130. See id. at 468 (“By this understanding [of Lawrence], the ‘intimacy’ protected by
the Constitution is essentially open ended.  It is not cabined by tradition or even by mod-
ern social consensus; rather, it is expandable with the imagination of the individual pur-
suit of self-realization, limited only by the duty to avoid injury to others.”); Last Resorts,
supra note 126, at 1989 (citation omitted) (claiming that an expansive reading of Lawrence R
“might initially appear to subject virtually all laws to strict scrutiny, for all limitations on
conduct burden the self-definitions of those who define themselves in terms of that con-
duct, it is in fact subject to principled constraints”).
131. For instance, David D. Meyer has expressed concern that “in defining the sort
of ‘injury’ contemplated by Lawrence, courts may turn to the understanding of ‘harm’
developed elsewhere in family-privacy caselaw.”  Meyer, supra note 82, at 470.  In that area R
of the law, “courts typically demand that the harm threatened to a child be ‘substantial’ or
even ‘severe.’” Id. at 471 (citations omitted).  So, “[g]iven the courts’ reluctance to find
cognizable ‘harm’ in these contexts, there might be reason to expect courts to give a
similarly narrow cast to the ‘injury’ exception suggested by Lawrence.  In that event, the
scope of fundamental ‘liberty’ relating to family and other intimacy would be significantly
enlarged.” Id. at 471–72 (citation omitted).
132. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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“direct[s] and restrain[s] [the Court’s] exposition of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.”133
Application of this standard, however, has been less than consistent.
To determine whether a statute proscribing access to HGGM vio-
lates substantive due process rights, courts must address an issue sunk
under grey waters134: whether there is a fundamental right of access to
HGGM technologies like three-parent IVF.  Yet deciding this is anything
but straightforward because the Court has neither articulated specific
bases on which it bases such fundamental rights nor employed consis-
tent rhetoric in its analysis.135  Further complicating matters, some have
argued that Casey and Lawrence modified the “history and tradition”
approach of Glucksberg into a new “autonomy approach”136—and the
trajectory of the Court’s recent decisions suggests that it may be gravi-
tating to this new approach.137
Consistent with the description prong of Glucksberg, this Part first
proffers an appropriate articulation of the asserted right.  Then it
argues that the articulated right fails both the “history and tradition”
prong of Glucksberg and the newer “autonomy approach.”
A. Framing the Asserted Right
Framing the asserted right is the first step in determining whether
government action has triggered substantive due process protections.
This step of the analysis is vital because the level of generality at which
this occurs is often dispositive of whether a fundamental right exists.138
In general, the analyzed right should be phrased narrowly.  But “the
precise framing of a right ought not to be conflated with the narrowest
and most concrete definition of the conduct the state seeks to punish;
the appropriate level of generality may require a broader understand-
ing of the asserted interest.”139  After considering some of the most
133. Assessing the Viability, supra note 126, at 2797 (alteration in original) (citing R
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21).
134. The Supreme Court has not even decided the constitutionality of traditional
IVF, a reproductive technology that has been available since the 1970s. Id. at 2793–94.
135. See id. at 2796–2800 (expounding on the lack of clarity employed by the rheto-
ric in fundamental rights cases); Joanna Nairn, Is There a Right to Have Children? Substantive
Due Process and Probation Conditions that Restrict Reproductive Rights, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1,
15 (2010) (citation omitted) (“The right to privacy, the Court [has held], extend[s] to
activities surrounding marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing and education.  Yet it is often unclear what level of specificity the Court will use to
define rights within that group.”).
136. See, e.g., Last Resorts, supra note 126, at 1986 (citing Robert C. Post, The Supreme R
Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4, 89 (2003)).
137. See Nairn, supra note 135, at 25–26 (“There appears to be a relatively strong R
societal consensus in favor of the right to procreate. . . . All evidence points to a move-
ment away from restrictions on procreation in favor of increased freedom in this area.”).
138. Pham, supra note 8, at 139 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON R
READING THE CONSTITUTION 73–112 (1991)).
139. Last Resorts, supra note 126, at 1987 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, R
566–67 (2003)); see also Assessing the Viability, supra note 126, at 2798–99 (describing Law- R
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plausible ways to articulate the right at stake, this section explains which
one is the most appropriate.
1. Right of Privacy in Genetically Modifying the Human Germ Line—
When framing the asserted right, Lawrence instructed courts to see the
forest, not the trees.  Courts should “not take such a myopic view of the
claimed right that [they] lose[ ] sight of the values at stake—the under-
lying fundamental freedoms that might be endangered if particular
conduct is prohibited.”140  In other words, courts err when they view
the “claimed right as identical to the conduct that the law prohibits,
thereby failing to capture all the relevant values that the ‘far-reaching
consequences’ of the law ‘touch[ ] upon.’”141  It was on this basis that
Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,142 which held that a Texas anti-
sodomy statute did not violate substantive due process.  The Bowers
court had erred because it framed the asserted right as the right to
engage in homosexual sodomy.  Likewise, framing the asserted right
here as the right to genetically modify one’s own germ line is
improper—it describes the precise conduct that will be prohibited.143
This articulation would run afoul of Lawrence.
2. Right of Privacy in Medical Autonomy—Some may argue that access
to HGGM is subsumed within a larger “right to medical autonomy,”
which protects the ability “to choose effective medical treatment pursu-
ant to a doctor’s recommendation.”144  The case law suggests that this
right is both negative and affirmative: it “protects not only the funda-
mental right to be free from unwanted medical treatment, but also the
freedom to obtain desired medical treatment in consultation with a
doctor.”145  But medical autonomy is not as broad as this language sug-
gests.  Because “obtaining necessary medical treatment may be just as
important to an individual’s dignity, autonomy, and avoidance of pain,
as is rejecting unwanted treatment,” the affirmative right of access to
desired treatment is limited to situations of necessity.146
Thus, the right to medical autonomy, properly understood, is nar-
rower than a right to choose from among several effective treat-
rence as having “muddied the meaning of the second Glucksberg prong” by departing from
the “established tendency to construe asserted rights narrowly”).
140. Last Resorts, supra note 126, at 1988. R
141. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–67).
142. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
143. Nancy Pham has proposed framing the asserted right as “the right to choose
the genetic or physical characteristics of one’s child using alternate reproductive technol-
ogy.”  Pham, supra note 8, at 140 (citing Jodi Danis, Sexism and “The Superfluous Female”: R
Arguments for Regulating Pre-Implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 248
(1995)).  But this is functionally identical to “the right to genetically modify a human
germ line.”  Thus, analysis remains the same: because it describes the actual conduct to be
prohibited, this framing of the right is too narrow.
144. Last Resorts, supra note 126, at 1995; see also John B. Attanasio, The Constitution- R
ality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity
Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1288 (1986).
145. Last Resorts, supra note 126, at 1995 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, R
479 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977)).
146. Id. at 1996 (emphasis added).
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ments the particular treatment the patient desires.  The
fundamental right is to consult with a doctor and to choose an
effective course of treatment; if only one effective treatment exists
for a patient, the patient has a fundamental liberty interest in
seeking it.147
This constraint makes the “right to medical autonomy” an inappro-
priate way to frame the right at stake.  It is easy to see why non-thera-
peutic HGGM is never necessary—there are few therapeutic
justifications for predetermining a child’s eye color.  But therapeutic
HGGM is also not “necessary,” as used in this context, because the right
to medical autonomy entails a particular breed of necessity.
Therapeutic HGGM seeks to eliminate a potential child’s diseases,
and the necessity of this technology relies on a key assumption: that it is
necessary to have a child.  But there is no settled, affirmative right to be
a parent,148 and having a child is never necessary, especially when there
is access to abortion.  Though many medical diseases, like diabetes, can
be the result of personal decisions,149 contracting a disease is generally
beyond human control.  In contrast, bearing a diseased child is predi-
cated upon choice.  And when it comes to mitochondrial diseases,
which parents know with near certainty that their child will inherit, it is
easy to isolate the parents’ decision to have a child as the first private
choice leading to that disease.  This discretion precludes parents from
arguing necessity—it is their own decision that has put a life in jeopardy
and “necessitated” the treatment sought.
Further, the right to medical autonomy implies decision-making
ability for oneself.150  By the time an individual has decided to geneti-
cally modify their child, they have already made the decision to have a
child.  Directing medical treatment for that child is not an exercise in
147. Id. at 1996–97 (citations omitted).
148. However, there may be an established right to retain the ability to procreate.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute
that permitted forced sterilization of convicted felons.  But the scope of this procreative
right is vague:
On the one hand, Skinner could be read as establishing a broad, generalized
right to procreative freedom that would include a fundamental freedom to
choose to reproduce. . . . On the other hand, the law struck down in Skinner was
specifically one that sought to destroy a person’s ability to procreate. Skinner
could thus be read as establishing only a negative right against forced destruc-
tion of one’s procreative capacities, as the Court never explicitly asserted a
broader fundamental right to procreate.
Assessing the Viability, supra note 126, at 2800.  Because the correct reading of Skinner is R
beyond the scope of this Note, it assumes that the narrower interpretation is valid.  This is
in keeping with the Court’s reluctance to recognize broad, affirmative rights under sub-
stantive due process. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (explaining
the Court’s hesitation in recognizing new substantive due process rights because this
“place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action”).
149. But this involves many singular choices, and none of those individually can be
fairly characterized as the “cause” of the disease.  It is impossible to single out one French
fry as the cause of heart disease, or to isolate one soda as the cause of diabetes.
150. See Autonomy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/autonomy (last visited March 1, 2014) (defining autonomy as “self-directing
freedom”).
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autonomy; it is a choice of treatment for another person.  Therefore,
access to HGGM is improperly framed as an exercise in medical
autonomy.
3. Right of Privacy in Reproductive Decisions—In its reproductive
rights jurisprudence, the Court has identified three substantive due
process rights that protect reproductive decisions: the rights to procrea-
tion, contraception, and abortion.151  But each of these rights—and
thus the right of privacy in reproductive decisions as a whole—is, in
reality, grounded in a right to bodily integrity.152  This rationale cabins
the right,153 limiting its application to situations in which that integrity
is threatened.  Consequently, defining the right to HGGM as part of the
broader “right to make decisions regarding reproduction” is “a disin-
genuous classification of HGGM.”154  Because “[HGGM] is radically dif-
ferent from traditional reproduction and does not involve a woman’s
bodily integrity, which was part of the rationale in Roe and Casey,” the
Court should decline to frame the asserted right as a protected part of
broader reproductive decision-making.155
4. Right of Privacy in Making Parental Decisions—The right of access
to HGGM may also be abstracted into a right to parental decision-mak-
ing, a right with firm roots in substantive due process doctrine.
“Indeed, some of the earliest cases to articulate the right to privacy did
151. See Assessing the Viability, supra note 126, at 2800. R
152. See Suter, Repugnance, supra note 126, at 1544 (citation omitted) (“[T]he inter- R
est in bodily integrity[ ] is deeply ensconced in our history and common law traditions.
The fact that the reproductive decisions that have occupied the Court—sterilization,
abortion, and contraception—all directly implicate bodily integrity only reinforces this
idea.”); B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
501, 506 (2009) (“The understanding of reproductive rights as health care rights, which
has long been present in reproductive rights jurisprudence, has been downplayed by both
courts and reproductive rights advocates in favor of a rhetoric centered on personal
autonomy, equality, and dignity.”); Pham, supra note 8, at 139 (citing Planned R
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992)) (“Roe and Casey were decided not only on
values of procreative liberty, but also on rules of bodily integrity.  That is, bodily integrity
was doing some of the work along with a woman’s right to make reproductive deci-
sions.”); see also Hill, supra note 152, at 506–10 (arguing that reproductive rights should R
be re-conceptualized as part of an overall right to health).
153. See Attanasio, supra note 144, at 1287 (“[T]he Court itself admits that the pro- R
tected sphere of liberty does not include all childbearing activity.”).
154. Pham, supra note 8, at 140 (citation omitted). R
155. Id. at 141.  Jason C. Glahn argues forcefully that HGGM is protected by sub-
stantive due process as well as the Ninth Amendment.  Glahn, supra note 30, at 430–38. R
But even he concedes that, under extant case law, this is probably an improper way to
frame the asserted right:
Since genetic modification involves the attempt to produce a child with certain
phenotypic traits rather than produce a child simpliciter, it is unlikely that it
would be viewed by the Court as involving the decision whether to “bear or
begat a child.” . . . The Court noted in Casey that the primary purpose of the
reproductive rights line of cases was to ensure the liberty and autonomy interests
of women.  Such interests probably do not extend to the decision whether to
bear a child if, and only if, it is a certain kind of child.
Id. at 428–29 (citation omitted).
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so in the context of parental decision[-]making.”156  In a series of cases,
“[t]he Supreme Court has generally protected parental autonomy in
child-rearing decisions, which includes decisions where children will
live, how they will be educated, and what values and morals they will be
taught.”157  This right is limited only by the harm principle, which
states that it is justifiable to interfere with parental autonomy only when
“parental action is likely to cause serious (and avoidable) harm to the
child.”158
Access to HGGM involves the relationship between a potential par-
ent and a future child.  Consequently, this Note agrees that restricting
access to HGGM is most plausibly seen as burdening parental autonomy
to choose the characteristics of their children.159  Courts should adopt
this framing of the asserted right for purposes of substantive due pro-
cess analysis.
B. Glucksberg’s History and Tradition Prong
The fundamental right burdened by restrictions on HGGM is the
right of parental decision-making.  In various decisions the Court has
expressed no doubt that this right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty.”160  The argument that this right includes a right of access to
HGGM proceeds thus: Substantive due process safeguards parental con-
trol over the child’s education in two primary areas—what and how
their children learn.  “[The Court] has protected the parents’ right to
choose the school that their child will attend and to influence her edu-
cation in the public school system.  It even has enforced the parental
right to choose the child’s religious upbringing . . . .”161  In other
words, “[t]he Court . . . should be construed as having articulated a
156. Suter, Repugnance, supra note 126, at 1548 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 R
U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
157. Pham, supra note 8, at 152 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; R
John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 481
(1996)).  In general, Pham writes, parents are given this authority so that they can raise
children the way they see fit. Id.  Still, though, parental decision-making can be subject to
certain state limitations and regulations. Id. “For example, parents cannot abuse their
children.” Id. at 152 n.130.
158. Carson Strong, Defective Infants and Their Impact on Families: Ethical and Legal
Considerations, 11 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 168, 171 (1983).
159. Even those arguing that substantive due process protects access to HGGM
agree that this is the most plausible way to frame the right at stake. See Glahn, supra note
30, at 430 (“[P]arental rights cases provide the strongest support for a fundamental right R
to genetic modification.”); see also Megan Anne Jellinek, Disease Prevention and the Genetic
Revolution: Defining a Parental Right to Protect the Bodily Integrity of Future Children, 27 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 369, 374 (1999) (arguing that “parents have a fundamental right to
protect the health and bodily integrity of their children by making crucial decisions at all
stages of human development”).
160. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citing Pierce v. Soc’y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
161. Attanasio, supra note 144, at 1291 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Meyer, 262 U.S. R
at 400; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213–14).
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general right of parents to inculcate positive traits in their children,
traits which the state ‘can neither supply nor hinder.’”162  Moreover,
modern genetic science has revealed that traits like intelligence, physi-
cal ability, and personality “may be influenced to some extent by
genetic factors,”163 and using this technology to enhance positive attrib-
utes is analogous to inculcating positive values through education.164
Since parental autonomy includes discretion to decide whether chil-
dren will receive the benefits of genetic modification, access to HGGM
is protected.165
But this reasoning fundamentally re-conceptualizes the parent-
child relationship: it assumes that there can be a parent before there is
yet a child.166  None of the parental decision-making cases address
unborn children; none of the reproductive rights cases (purport to)
consider “children.”  Indeed, established substantive due process juris-
prudence demonstrates that different privacy rights attach to decisions
about born, versus potential, life.167
Moreover, this distinction is meaningful and should be main-
tained.  There is significant cognitive dissonance in holding that an
advanced, cutting-edge technology like HGGM somehow has basis in
“history and tradition.”168  Plus, the language of parental autonomy is
far broader than the language of reproductive rights.  The latter has
been limited to situations in which a person’s bodily integrity is
threatened, while the former is usually limited only by the harm princi-
ple.169  Allowing the right of parental autonomy to extend to control
over germ cells and fertilized ova would render the bodily integrity limi-
tation nugatory.  This would dramatically expand the scope of substan-
162. Glahn, supra note 30, at 431 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 R
(1972)); see also Attanasio, supra note 144, at 1291 (positing that the doctrine of substan- R
tive due process has protected liberty in child rearing and liberty in child bearing, both of
which “shield the family from governmental intrusion”).
163. Glahn, supra note 30, at 430 (citing ELLIOT SOBER, THE MEANING OF GENETIC R
CAUSATION IN FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 347, 354 (Allen Buchanan,
Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels & Daniel Wikler eds., Cambridge U. Press 2002)).
164. See Attanasio, supra note 144, at 1291 (“The right to form the body and mind R
with [HGGM] is analogous to molding the child through education.”).
165. Glahn, supra note 30, at 430–34. R
166. HGGM can occur at one of two times: prior to conception, through modifica-
tion of a parent’s germ cells; or after conception, through modification of the fertilized
ovum. See supra Part II.A.  And according to established reproductive rights jurispru-
dence, a fertilized ovum is not a legal person. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992) (emphasis added) (“[A]bortion involves the purposeful termi-
nation of potential life . . . .”).  Therefore, at neither point in time is the “parent” modify-
ing their “child”; they are modifying a “potential life.”
167. Compare Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of privacy in mak-
ing parental decisions) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right of privacy in
making parental decisions) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy in
reproductive decision-making) and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (right of privacy in reproductive decision-making).
168. See Suter, Repugnance, supra note 126, at 1541 (“If physician-assisted suicide is R
not part of our ‘Nation’s history and tradition,’ it raises a question as to whether advanced
reproductive technologies—such as IVF, prenatal testing, PIGD, or reproductive genetic
modification—would be.”).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 157–58. R
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tive due process rights, permitting state regulation only when “parental
action is likely to cause serious (and avoidable) harm to the child.”170
Rather than place such an extreme amount of consensual conduct
beyond regulation,171 courts should hold that HGGM is not protected
by the right of parental decision-making.
C. The “Autonomy Approach”
The “autonomy approach” was discussed earlier in the context of
judicial review.172  It was argued that this standard is inappropriate for a
nascent technology with unknown consequences.  But even if a court
adopts the “autonomy approach” within the substantive due process
context, access to HGGM should not be protected.
Even advocates of the expansive autonomy approach admit that it
should have a limit: the harm principle.  For instance, John A. Robert-
son, a fierce proponent of procreative autonomy, supports “a liberty
claim-right to use genetic knowledge and techniques to have healthy
offspring to nurture and rear.”173  And yet, he believes that this broad
access to genetic technology should be limited “if [it] imposed serious
harms on the persons most directly affected by them.”174  This makes
good sense: without meaningful constraint, individuals could engage in
any course of conduct intended to bring self-fulfillment, regardless of
the effects on others.
Further, under the autonomy approach rights that have already
been identified as fundamental are to be retained.  One of these is a
right to bodily integrity, recognized by the Roe and Casey line of cases.
And while access to abortion is easily justified under the autonomy
approach,175 access to HGGM is fundamentally different because modi-
fication of a “potential life” occurs under the assumption that it will be
brought to term.  Stated differently, HGGM implicates a human life
because the intended result is to produce children.  So courts must con-
sider whether the technology threatens the bodily integrity of those
children.
Furthermore, HGGM is likely to result in both bodily and psycho-
logical harm.  Especially while the technology is being developed, there
is strong likelihood that children will be born with physical defects.176
And widespread use of HGGM could lead to a host of psychological
issues.177  Legislation prohibiting access to the technology would pre-
170. Strong, supra note 158, at 171. R
171. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (explaining that the
Court is hesitant to expand substantive due process rights because this increases the
amount of activity that is “outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.”).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 122–30. R
173. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED.
439, 484 (2003).
174. Id.
175. Destroying a fertilized ovum maintains the bodily integrity of a woman and
causes no harm to a human person because it is only a “potential life.” See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992).
176. See Reiss, supra note 14. R
177. See supra text accompanying notes 15–18. R
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vent all of this damage.  Thus, true commitment to the harm princi-
ple178 means ruling that there is no fundamental right of access to
genetic modification technologies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Three-parent IVF dips our toes into the pool of human germ line
modification.  Access to this technology would open the door to further
manipulation of genetic material, and this could have disastrous effects
on society at large.  This Note has examined various legal theories that
might sustain access to HGGM.  But many are inappropriate for such a
unique reproductive technology, and even the doctrine of substantive
due process is of no avail.  Established jurisprudential principles do not
guarantee access to HGGM, so legislation that prohibits this access
should be reviewed under the rational basis standard.  And because
many legitimate governmental interests justify such a prohibition,
courts should hold that the restriction is constitutional.
178. A contrary conclusion risks justifying the ends by the means—likelihood of
harm to even one human life should not justify access to HGGM.  This is consistent with
the bioethical principle of nonmaleficence, which “asserts an obligation not to inflict
harm on others.” PATRICIA A. KING, ET AL., LAW, MEDICINE, AND ETHICS 47 (2006) (quot-
ing TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (2001)).
